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THE BLIX WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMMISSION REPORT: 
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS RELATED ISSUES 
 
by Graham S. Pearson 
 
Introduction 
 
1.   The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) was established by an initiative 
at the end of June 2003 by the late Foreign Minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh, in response a 
proposal by then United Nations Under-Secretary-General Jayantha Dhanapala, to create an 
independent international commission to examine how the world could tackle the problem of 
weapons of mass destruction1.  The Swedish Government invited Dr. Hans Blix to set up and 
chair the Commission. Dr. Blix presented the composition of the Commission to the public 
on 16 December, 2003 and set out what he saw were major tasks for it.   
 
2.  The mandate for the Commission as stated on its website2 was as follows: 
 
The Commission should seek to identify desirable and achievable directions for 
international cooperation. It should present realistic proposals aimed at the greatest 
possible reduction of the dangers of weapons of mass destruction. These should 
comprise both short-term and long-term approaches and aim at preventing the further 
spread of weapons as well as at their reduction and elimination. The scope of the 
investigation should be comprehensive and include nuclear, biological, chemical and 
radiological weapons and the means of delivering them, as well as possible links 
between these issues and terrorists.  
 
The Commission should not be engaged in any tasks or negotiations at the 
governmental or intergovernmental level. 
 
The Commission should help to stimulate an informed public debate about 
international and national efforts against weapons of mass destruction. It should 
therefore undertake outreach activities within its capacity to engage civil society and 
non-governmental organisations.  
 
The mandate was adopted by the Commission at its meeting on 28 January 2004. 
 
3.  The membership of the Commission was as follows: 
 
Hans Blix, Chairman 
Dewi Fortuna Anwar 
Alexei G. Arbatov 
Marcos de Azambuja 
Alyson J.K. Bailes 
Jayantha Dhanapala 
Gareth Evans 
Patricia Lewis 
                                                 
1 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Final Report, ‘Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Arms’, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006, p. 11.  Available at 
http:/www.wmdcommission.org. 
2 Available at http:/www.wmdcommission.org. 
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Masashi Nishihara 
William J. Perry 
Vasantha Raghavan 
Cheikh Sylla 
Prince El Hassan bin Talal 
Pan, Zhenqiang 
 
Short biographical statements are provided for the Commissioners on pages 208—211 of the 
Final Report.  One member of the Commission, Gareth Evans, had also served as a member 
of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change3. 
 
4.  The Commission met ten times between its first meeting on 28—30 January 2004 and its 
final, tenth meeting on 3—5 March 2006. The Commission tasked a number of individual 
researchers, academic institutions and “think tanks” to produce papers and studies on issues 
related to the Commission’s mandate. These varied in depth and scope, ranging from 
comprehensive studies to brief papers providing just a short description of the situation and 
some proposal/s on how to reduce the dangers from WMD. They served as food for thought 
and provide ideas for the ongoing discussion within the Commission.  The forty papers and 
studies have been published on the Commission’s website4 as pdf-files, but some will also be 
available in print.  The Commission, however, point out that the fact that these papers and 
studies have been commissioned by the WMDC and have been published on the 
Commission’s website does not necessarily indicate that the Commission agrees the findings 
of the studies and papers. 
 
5.  The Final Report entitled Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Arms was issued on 1 June 2006 when the WMDC Chairman Dr. Hans Blix 
presented the Commission report to the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 
New York. The report contains sixty concrete proposals on how the world could be freed of 
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.  The report was also handed over to Sweden's 
Foreign Minister Jan Eliasson, also president of the United Nations General Assembly and to 
the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr Sergei Ordzhonikidze, 
Director-General of the United Nations in Geneva. 
 
6. After receiving the report, an UN spokesman announced that the Secretary-General 
welcomed the release of the report of the Independent Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Commission. He stressed that this report will be an important contribution to the debate on 
disarmament and non-proliferation. The Secretary-General urged the international 
community to study the report and consider its recommendations. 
 
7.   Using a similar approach to that adopted for the analysis5 of the biological weapons 
related issues in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change Report6 issued on 2 December 2004,this Bradford Review 
                                                 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
4 Available at http:/www.wmdcommission.org. 
5 Graham S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel: Biological Weapons Related Issues, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 14, May 2005.  Available 
at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
6 United Nations General Assembly, Note by the Secretary-General, A/59/565, 2 December 2004. 
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Conference Paper sets out the conclusions and recommendations relating to biological 
weapons in the WMD Commission’ report and then analyses them from the point of view of 
the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.  Consideration is given 
to how these should be addressed and taken forward at the BTWC Sixth Review Conference 
in 2006 by considering the WMDC recommendations in the light of the points made in 
Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 167 of March 2006. 
  
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms 
 
12.   The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission 227 page report8, Weapons of Terror: 
Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, addresses nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons together with delivery means, missile defences and weapons in space 
before going on to consider export controls, international assistance and non-governmental 
actors and then finally compliance, verification, enforcement and the role of the United 
Nations.   After chapters that set the scene by considering ‘reviving disarmament’ and 
‘weapons of terror: threats and responses’, separate chapters address nuclear, biological and 
toxin, and chemical weapons.    Sixty recommendations are made; the first 30 being nuclear 
weapons related, 6 relating to biological and toxin weapons and 6 to chemical weapons, 4 to 
delivery means, 7 to export controls, international assistance and 7 to compliance, 
verification, enforcement and the role of the United Nations. 
 
13.  In this analysis, attention is focussed on the chapter relating to biological and toxin 
weapons and its recommendations as well as other more general recommendations that are 
also applicable to biological and toxin weapons.  Particular attention is given to how the 
WMDC recommendations in regard to biological and toxin weapons might be taken forward 
at the Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to be held 
in Geneva on 20 November to 8 December 2006. 
 
14.  Hans Blix, the WMDC Chairman, in his preface to the Final Report accurately notes that: 
 
In the ten years that have passed since the Canberra Commission report was 
published, global economic interdependence has accelerated. All states of the world 
have come to face the same environmental threats and risks of contagious diseases. 
There have been no serious territorial or ideological conflicts between the major 
military powers. Yet, amazingly, the climate for agreements on arms control and 
disarmament has actually deteriorated. 
 
Efforts to consolidate global treaties, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, have stagnated, ratifications of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remain missing, and negotiations have not 
even opened on the much needed treaty to stop the production of fissile material for 
weapons. 
 
                                                 
7 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
8 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Final Report, ‘Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, 
Biological, and Chemical Arms’, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006, p. 11.  Available at 
http:/www.wmdcommission.org. 
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15.  He goes on to identify some positive features against a ‘generally gloomy short-term 
outlook for arms control and disarmament’ that include: 
 
The Security Council has recently adopted an important resolution obligating 
member states to adopt domestic legislation designed to prevent the proliferation of 
WMD. The precedent is constructive. But if the Council were to further use and 
develop its quasi-legislative potential, it would need to ensure that it acts with the 
broad support of the UN members. In the longer run this would entail making the 
Council more representative of the UN membership. 
 
Lastly, in today’s rapidly integrating world community, global treaties and global 
institutions, like the UN, the IAEA and the OPCW, remain indispensable. Even with 
their shortcomings they can do some important things that states acting alone cannot 
achieve. They are therefore essential instruments in the hands of the state community 
to enhance security, to jointly operate inspection systems and to reduce the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction. Governments that have shown disenchantment with 
global treaties and institutions will inevitably return and renew their engagement. 
 
16.  The Committee’s recommendations are usefully envisaged as contributing to the 
practical agenda:  
 
When there is a greater general readiness to return to a cooperative multilateral 
system in the sphere of arms control and disarmament, the Commission’s report, I 
hope, will contribute to the practical agenda. Some ideas and recommendations are 
new, but the Commission also espouses and argues in favour of some well-known 
existing proposals. 
 
Biological and Toxin Weapons 
 
17.  Chapter 4 in some 12 pages addresses biological and toxin weapons.   It starts by rightly 
pointing out that: 
 
Biological warfare and bioterrorism involve the deliberate cause or spread of disease 
by biological agents, used as a weapon. Such weapons have the potential to cause 
immense human harm, panic and societal disruption. Although governments have 
long understood that eliminating the threats posed by these weapons will require 
extensive international cooperation, the need for such cooperation is more urgent 
today than ever. 
 
It goes on to address why there is this additional urgency identifying a number of converging 
developments. Most of these are soundly based.   However, one concern that is identified is: 
 
Yet another concern arises from the possible misuse or negative impact of biodefence 
programmes, such as their potential to provide cover for the illegal development or 
maintenance of biological weapons-related expertise. 
 
This is not very well expressed.  The point is that outbreaks of disease occur in nature and it 
is important for all States to prepare defences against such outbreaks.  Furthermore, planning 
for disease outbreaks whether natural or deliberate is best integrated.  Consequently, the 
emphasis needs to be put onto transparency – such as the provision of information under the 
6 
BTWC Confidence-Building Measures – about programmes to counter disease outbreaks or 
intoxinations. There is a danger that to use terminology such as “biodefence” or “biological 
weapons-related expertise” can result in a failure to pay attention to the equally relevant 
work to counter disease outbreaks whether in humans, animals or plants as States may say 
that they have no biological weapons-related programmes and have no biodefence activities.  
The sentence would have been more correctly expressed (changes shown in bold) as follows: 
 
 Yet another concern arises from the possible misuse or negative impact of 
programmes to counter outbreaks of disease in man, animals or plants, as these 
could provide cover for the illegal development or maintenance of biological 
weapons-related expertise. 
 
18.  The opening section correctly points out the importance of striking a delicate balance 
between the public’s legitimate right to know and the duty to minimize the risk of causing 
collective disruption or panic.   It also rightly states that  it may be difficult in the early stages 
of an outbreak to determine whether a disease has been deliberately induced or has occurred 
naturally. 
BOX 16 
19.  In the next section Prohibition of Biological Weapons the report sets out the history 
leading up to the opening for signature of the BTWC.   In the second paragraph it is stated 
that: 
 
During the war, other states also conducted biological warfare research. After World 
War II, a number of biological warfare research programmes were undertaken, the 
largest of which were conducted by the Soviet Union and the United States – the 
diseases that were made to be used as weapons included anthrax, smallpox, plague 
and tularaemia. 
 
This has incorrectly used the term “research” when it would have been correct to use the 
word programme in the first line and omit the word “research” in the second line as these 
were programmes aimed at the development and use of biological weapons and NOT 
research programmes..   It is important to be very careful in using the word “research” when 
addressing biological weapons issues as the BTWC does not prohibit research but does 
prohibit development, production and acquisition of biological and toxin weapons.   It is also 
evident that the term ‘research” can cover very different types of activities in different 
countries.   It is generally wiser to use the word ‘programmes’ or “activities” and not 
“research” in this context.  The above sentences in the report would have been much better 
rephrased (changes shown in bold) as: 
 
During the war, other states also conducted biological warfare activities. After World 
War II, a number of biological warfare programmes were undertaken, the largest of 
which were conducted by the Soviet Union and the United States – the diseases that 
were made to be used as weapons included anthrax, smallpox, plague and tularaemia. 
 
20.  The final paragraph in this section addresses the requirements of Security Council 
Resolution 1540 and concludes with the following final sentence: 
 
This in effect enhances Article IV of the BTWC, which calls on states parties to 
prohibit the acquisition of biological weapons by any person under their jurisdiction 
or control. 
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Article IV of the BTWC actually states: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, 
equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the 
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. 
 
21.  Consequently the statement in the WMDC report that resolution 1540 effectively 
enhances Article IV of the BTWC is partially correct in that it enhances the element of 
Article IV related “to prohibit”.  However, resolution 1540 does not address the second 
element in Article IV requiring that each State Party take necessary measures “to prohibit 
and prevent” [Emphasis added] which requires more than just to prohibit.  As pointed out in 
Bradford Briefing Paper No. 6 (Second Series)9 in July 2003, by definition, the national 
measures taken must do more than merely prohibit the forbidden activities; they must also 
prevent them.  This prevention requirement sets a high standard of effectiveness.  It is indeed 
a very stringent criterion to attach to national implementing measures, but it is explicitly 
included in Article IV of the Convention and thus constitutes one of the obligations flowing 
from the Convention.   It can usefully be regarded as a test of the effectiveness of legislation 
and other measures of a prohibitory nature in each State Party.  If a State Party's legislative 
and other prohibitions are not strong enough to prevent the activities involving biological 
weapons which are defined in Article I of the Convention, they do not meet the high standard 
set by Article IV and that State Party accordingly risks falling short of full compliance with 
its international obligations under the Convention.  
 
22.  The States Parties to the BTWC at the Sixth Review Conference need therefore to 
address both elements of Article IV – to prohibit and prevent – and it would be desirable for 
the Review Conference in its Final Declaration to express the above as a common 
understanding of the significance of the prevention criterion set by Article IV and to 
recommend that States Parties take effective action by reviewing the effectiveness of their 
national measures to implement the prohibitions of the Convention in meeting the prevention 
criterion. 
 
Prospects for the Future 
 
Strengthening the Role of the Convention 
 
23.  The next section of the report addresses how the role of the BTWC might be 
strengthened.  The second paragraph correctly emphasises that: 
  
In the Commission’s view, efforts to achieve some level of multilaterally agreed 
principles and powers should be pursued, although the complexities of the challenge 
make it necessary to counter biological-weapon threats from a variety of angles.  
 
                                                 
9 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Maximizing the Benefits of the Inter Review Conference Process: I: 
National Implementing Legislation, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 6 
(Second Series), July 2003, para 14.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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It then goes on to accurately highlight a number of activities which the international 
community should focus on: 
 
The international community should focus simultaneously on the following types of 
activity, all of which contribute to the overall regime for control of the hostile uses of 
the life sciences. 
 
• strengthening and effective enforcement of international agreements, 
including monitoring and reporting 
• increasing public health awareness combined with enhanced health and 
safety regulations, measures and resources 
• controls on transfers of material and equipment 
• norm building among all those engaged in the life sciences and in society as 
a whole 
• public information 
• counter-terrorism intelligence and tools. 
 
24.  The next couple of paragraphs set out how these should be taken forward and end with a 
sentence: 
 
However, a key to progress worldwide would be for the US to commit itself actively to 
international approaches and instruments. 
 
Whilst undoubtedly true, the statement needs to be more widely expressed as all states need 
to commit themselves actively to international approaches and instruments.   It is very true 
that if the United States is actively engaged in promoting international approaches and 
instruments then many other states will follow such a lead.  However, as consensus requires 
all states to agree, all need to commit themselves actively to international approaches and 
instruments. 
 
25.   This section concludes with a final paragraph that states accurately and correctly; 
 
The last full review of the operation of the BTWC was in 1991. In view of 
developments since then, the parties need to carry out a full review during the 2006 
Review Conference. It is crucially important for the BTWC states parties to use the 
Sixth Review Conference, to be held in late 2006, to reassert the Convention’s role as 
the central component of the overall regime and agree on concrete measures to 
implement it. The Commission’s recommendations aim at making maximum use of 
this opportunity. 
 
The Commission is to be complimented for focussing as stated in the final sentence of this 
section on recommendations that make maximum use of the opportunity at the Sixth Review 
Conference from 20 November to 8 December 2006 of reasserting the BTWC’s central role 
in the overall regime and to agree on concrete measures to implement it. 
 
26.  Recommendation 31.  The first recommendation of the Commission in the field on 
biological and toxin weapons is at the end of this section and is: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 31 
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All states not yet party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should 
adhere to the Convention. The states parties to the Convention should launch a 
campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the Seventh Review 
Conference, to be held in 2011. 
 
This recommendation is strongly supported.   Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1610 in 
March 2006 included the following paragraphs on this subject: 
 
“27.  At successive Review Conferences the States Parties have called upon States 
which have not yet ratified or acceded to the Convention to do so without delay.  Thus 
at the Fourth Review Conference the Final Declaration11 under Article XIV: 
 
1. The Conference notes with satisfaction that a number of States have 
acceded to the Convention since the Third Review Conference. 
 
2. The Convention calls upon States which have not yet ratified or 
acceded to the Convention to do so without delay and upon those States which 
have not signed the Convention to join the States Parties thereto, thus 
contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the Convention. 
 
3. In this connection, the Conference requests States Parties to 
encourage wider adherence to the Convention. 
 
4. The Conference particularly welcomes regional initiatives that would 
lead to wider accession to the Convention. 
 
In addition, the resolution adopted by the General Assembly without a vote on 8 
December 2005 as A/RES/60/96 included as its first operative paragraph: 
 
1.  Notes with satisfaction the increase in the number of States parties to the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their 
Destruction, reaffirms the call upon all signatory States that have not yet 
ratified the Convention to do so without delay, and calls upon those States that 
have not yet signed the Convention to become parties thereto at an early date, 
thus contributing to the achievement of universal adherence to the 
Convention. 
 
28.  There is therefore a widespread and continuing recognition by all States Parties of 
the importance of achievement of universal adherence to the Convention.  However, 
the rate at which States have become Parties to the Convention has been very slow 
during recent years: 
 
                                                 
10 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
11 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
10 
 
 
 
 October 
2001 
October 
2002 
November 
2003 
December  
2004 
June 2005 
Number of States 
Parties 
144 146 151 153 155 
Number of 
Signatory States 
18 17 16 16 16 
 
29.  This slow rate of approaching universality is all the more pronounced when a 
comparison is made with the Chemical Weapons Convention which entered into force 
on 29 April 1997.  At its First Review Conference12 in April/May 2003, the States 
Parties in regard to universality of the CWC agreed that: 
 
The First Review Conference recommended that the Council, with the 
cooperation of the Secretariat, develop and implement a plan of action to 
further encourage, in a systematic and coordinated manner, adherence to the 
Convention and to assist States ready to join the Convention in their national 
preparations to implement it [Emphasis added] (RC-1/5, para.7.18). 
 
The background paper13 provided by the OPCW on adherence to the CWC for the 
First Review Conference provided a summary of the participation in the Convention: 
 
Date Number of 
States Parties 
Number of 
States Parties for 
which Entry into 
Force was 
pending 
Signatory States 
not Party 
Non-Signatory 
States not Party 
29 April 1997 87 0 78 28 
29 April 1998 107 1 60 25 
29 April 1999 121 0 48 24 
29 April 2000 132 3 37 21 
29 April 2001 143 0 31 19 
29 April 2002 143 0 31 19 
 
30.    Since adoption of the Action Plan on Universality following the CWC Review 
Conference, the number of States Parties has increased14 significantly: 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Report of the First Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review 
Conference) 28 April – 9 May 2003, RC-1/5, 9 May 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
13 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Background Paper on Universal Adherence 
to the Chemical Weapons Convention, RC-1/S/5, 25 April 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
14 Scott Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC 
Experience, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 13, April 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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 May 2003 October 
2003 
June 
2004 
February  
2005 
March 
2006 
Number of States 
Parties 
151 154 164 167 178 
Number of States 
Parties for which 
Entry into Force 
was pending 
2 3 0 0 0 
Signatory States 
not Party 
25 22 18 16 8 
Non-Signatory 
States not Party 
16 15 12 11 8 
 
31.  It is thus evident that in March 2006, the States Parties to the CWC are some 178, 
over twenty more than the number of States Parties to the BTWC.  There is 
consequently a window of opportunity at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference 
in November/December 2006 for the States Parties to the BTWC to mount an 
initiative to encourage all those States who have acceded to the CWC to also accede 
to the BTWC.   Rather than just adopting an exhortation, as at previous Review 
Conferences, it would be timely to agree to actually do something to achieve the 
objective of universality.   Whilst this might be called an Action Plan there might be 
advantage in adopting some different terminology such as an achievement timeline 
with the objective of reaching 180 States Parties to the BTWC no later than the 
Seventh Review Conference in 2011.   The States Parties at the Sixth Review 
Conference in agreeing this achievement timeline need to also agree on how the 
initiative is to be progressed and how the progress towards this objective will be 
reported regularly to the States Parties.   Such a progress report would be appropriate 
at future annual Meetings of the States Parties at which agreement could be reached 
on additional action should that be necessary.” 
 
 
27. Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 16 recommended that the States Parties agree the 
objective of reaching 180 States Parties to the BTWC no later than the Seventh Review 
Conference in 2011.  The WMDC recommendation 31 urges adoption of a campaign to 
achieve universal adherence by 2011.   This more ambitious target is welcomed and States 
Parties are encouraged to adopt this goal at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
National Implementation 
 
28.  The WMDC report next addresses national implementation.  It correctly emphasises that 
the effectiveness of the prohibitions of the BTWC depends on the full national implementation 
of the Convention through national legislation and regulations.   It then goes on to 
recommend that interested governments should promote a network of designated national 
authorities or functional focal points.     
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29.  This section points out the important role of Confidence-Building Measures but then, 
unfortunately, as already pointed out earlier in paragraph 17 above, the report uses language 
about “biological weapon-related matters” in saying that: 
 
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) can play an important role. The second BTWC 
Review Conference, held in 1986, agreed that parties should make annual 
declarations on various biological weapon-related matters in an effort to increase 
transparency and build confidence. These were revised and expanded in 1991, at the 
third Review Conference. 
 
30.  The actual CBMs are focused on various aspects of life science activities.  Namely, using 
the language of the Third Review Conference which agreed the expanded measures in 1991, 
they are: 
 
  Confidence-building measure "A": 
 
- Part1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories; 
 
- Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence research and 
development programmes. 
 
Confidence-building measure "B": 
 
- Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins 
 
Confidence-building measure "C": 
 
- Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use of knowledge. 
 
Confidence-building measure "D": 
 
- Active promotion of contacts. 
 
Confidence-building measure "E": 
 
- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures. 
 
Confidence-building measure "F": 
 
- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological 
research and development programmes 
 
Confidence-building measure "G": 
 
- Declaration of vaccine production facilities 
 
It can be seen clearly that of these seven CBMs only one (CBM “F”) is actually specifically 
related to biological weapons.   One of the others (CBM “A” Part 2) is related to biological 
defence programmes – which should, as pointed out previously in paragraph 17, be addressed 
13 
as programmes to counter outbreaks of disease in humans, animals or plants.  All the other 
CBMs are related to general life sciences activities.    
 
31.  The WMDC report would have been wiser to have used language that made this clear 
(changes in bold): 
 
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) can play an important role. The second BTWC 
Review Conference, held in 1986, agreed that parties should make annual 
declarations on various life sciences-related matters in an effort to increase 
transparency and build confidence. These were revised and expanded in 1991, at the 
third Review Conference. 
 
The use of misleading language is particularly regretted as it provides an excuse to some 
States Parties for failing to submit the politically agreed annual CBMs by saying that they 
have no biological weapons-related activities. 
 
32.  Recommendation 32.  This section on national implementation concludes with the 
second recommendation of the Commission in the field on biological and toxin weapons 
which is: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 32 
 
To achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations to implement 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention completely and effectively, the states 
parties should offer technical assistance and promote best-practice models of such 
legislation. As a part of the confidence-building process and to promote transparency 
and harmonization, all states parties should make annual biological-weapon-related 
national declarations and make them public. 
 
The first sentence of this recommendation is strongly supported and the second sentence is 
likewise, once modified so as to be accurate and state: 
 
As a part of the confidence-building process and to promote transparency and 
harmonization, all states parties should make annual life sciences-related national 
declarations and make them public. 
 
33. Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1615 in March 2006 included the following 
paragraphs on the subject of national implementation: 
 
“32. At successive Review Conferences the States Parties have reaffirmed the 
importance of Article IV of the Convention.  Thus at the Fourth Review Conference 
the Final Declaration16 under Article IV stated: 
 
                                                 
15 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
16 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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1. The Conference underlines the importance of Article IV.  It reaffirms 
the commitment of States Parties to take the necessary national measures 
under this Article, in accordance with their constitutional processes.  These 
measures are to ensure the prohibition and prevention of the development, 
production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, 
weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the 
Convention anywhere within their territory, under their jurisdiction or under 
their control, in order to prevent their use for purposes contrary to the 
Convention.  The States Parties recognize the need to ensure, through the 
review and/or adoption of national measures, the effective fulfilment of their 
obligations under the Convention in order, inter alia, to exclude use of 
biological and toxin weapons in terrorist or criminal activity. 
 
2. The Conference notes those measures already taken by a number of 
States Parties in this regard, for example the adoption of penal legislation, 
and reiterates its call to any State Party that has not yet taken any necessary 
measures to do so immediately, in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.  Such measures should apply within its territory, under its 
jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.  The Conference invites each State 
Party to consider, if constitutionally possible and in conformity with 
international law, the application of such measures also to actions taken 
anywhere by natural persons possessing its nationality. 
 
33.  In addition, national implementation was one of the issues considered during the 
2003 to 2005 intersessional process17 when the topic in 2003 was: 
 
i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions 
set forth in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
The outcome of the Meeting of States Parties in 2003 was to agree a short report18 on 
both of the topics saying: 
 
At the Meeting of States Parties, States Parties noted that notwithstanding the 
differing legal and constitutional arrangements among the 151 States Parties 
to the Convention, States have adopted similar basic approaches and share 
common principles. The States Parties stressed the need for undertaking 
activities at the national level in keeping with their obligations and 
responsibilities to strengthen and implement the Convention. The States 
Parties agreed, to that end, on the value of the following: 
 
To review, and where necessary, enact or update national legal, 
including regulatory and penal, measures which ensure effective 
                                                 
17 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001 and 11 – 22 November 2002. Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
18 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction, First 
Meeting, Geneva, 10 – 14 November 2003. Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2003/4 (Vol. 1), 
24 November 2003. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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implementation of the prohibition of the Convention, and which 
enhance effective security of pathogens and toxins. 
 
The positive effect of cooperation between States Parties with differing 
legal and constitutional arrangements. States Parties in a position to 
do so may wish to provide legal and technical assistance to others who 
request it in framing and/or expanding their own legislation and 
controls in the areas of national implementation and biosecurity. 
 
The need for comprehensive and concrete national measures to secure 
pathogen collections and the control of their use for peaceful purposes. 
There was a general recognition of the value of biosecurity measures 
and procedures, which will ensure that such dangerous materials are 
not accessible to persons who might or could misuse them for purposes 
contrary to the Convention. 
 
States Parties considered that agreement on the value of these measures 
discussed at the Meeting constitutes an essential effort to facilitate more 
effective implementation and enforcement of the Convention, as well as 
providing a basis for review of progress at the 2006 Review Conference. 
 
34.  In addition, national implementation measures have been the subject of an Action 
Plan undertaken by the States Parties to the CWC following their First Review 
Conference in 2003.  At that Review Conference the States Parties agreed19: 
 
The First Review Conference called upon States Parties that have not already 
done so to inform the OPCW by the next regular session of the Conference of 
the status of their adoption of the legislative and administrative measures 
necessary for or taken by them to implement the Convention, of any problems 
they have encountered, and of any assistance they require.   Having 
considered the importance of national implementation measures for the 
proper functioning of the Convention, and having reviewed the activities 
undertaken by the States Parties as well as the Secretariat, the First Review 
Conference… 
 
(h) agreed to develop, at its next regular session, a plan of action 
based on a recommendation from the Council regarding the 
implementation of Article VII obligations, with the objective of 
fostering the full and effective implementation of the Convention by all 
States Parties. [Emphasis added] (RC-1/5, para.7.83). 
 
35.  Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1320 described the action being taken by 
the OPCW and a further update was published21 in the CBW Conventions Bulletin of 
September/December 2005.   The situation can be summarised as follows: 
                                                 
19 Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Report of the First Special Session of the 
Conference of the States Parties to Review the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review 
Conference) 28 April – 9 May 2003, RC-1/5, 9 May 2003.  Available at http://www.opcw.org. 
20 Scott Spence, Achieving Effective Action on Universality and National Implementation: The CWC 
Experience, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 13, April 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Status at Number of 
States Parties 
Number (and percentage) of 
States Parties that have 
submitted national 
implementation 
Legislation covers 
area key to the 
enforcement of the 
CWC 
May 1997 87 0 (0%) Not available 
December 1997 103 24 (23%) Not available 
November 1998 120 40 (33%) Not available 
July 1999 125 43 (34%) Not available 
May 2000 133 48 (36%) Not available 
May 2001 143 53 (38%) Not available 
October 2002 145 70 (48%) 39 (27%) 
October 2003 154 94 (61%) 51 (33%) 
November 2004 166 96 (58%) 52 (31%) 
November 2005 174 106 (61%) 59 (34%) 
 
This shows that even after the Action Plan, although almost two thirds of the States 
Parties to the CWC had submitted information on their national implementation to the 
OPCW, only about one third of the States Parties had succeeded in adopting 
legislation that covered the areas key to the enforcement of the CWC. 
 
36.  The situation in regard to the adoption of national measures to implement the 
BTWC, as required by Article IV of the Convention which requires: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its 
constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent 
the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the 
agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I 
of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or 
under its control anywhere. 
 
is much less certain than that for the CWC.   There is, however, no basis on which to 
conclude that the situation is any better and it is likely to be worse. 
 
37.  There is widespread recognition of the importance of all States Parties adopting 
national legislation to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, 
acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of 
delivery specified in article I of the Convention.   The adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 1540 (2004)22 has also provided additional impetus for all States – and not 
solely the States Parties to the BTWC – to adopt national legislation.  Operative 
paragraph 2 requires: 
                                                                                                                                                        
21 Santiago Oñate, Ralf Trapp and Lisa Tabassi, Decision on the Follow-up to the OPCW Action Plan on Article 
VII: Ensuring the Effective Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, CBW Conventions Bulletin, 
Issue No 69 + 70, September/December 2005, pp. 5-10. 
 
22 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1540 (2004) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th 
meeting, on 28 April 2004, S/RES/1540 (2004), 28 April 2004. 
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2. Decides also that all States, in accordance with their national procedures, 
shall adopt and enforce appropriate effective laws which prohibit any non-
State actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or 
use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery, in 
particular for terrorist purposes, as well as attempts to engage in any of the 
foregoing activities, participate in them as an accomplice, assist or finance 
them; [Emphasis added] 
 
It would therefore be timely – and bring significant benefits to all States Parties – for 
the States Parties to the BTWC at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in 
November/December 2006 to do more than simply adopt an exhortation along the 
lines of those agreed previously at Review Conferences.  There is a need for action to 
adopt national legislation to counter the continuing threat posed by biological and 
toxin weapons whether by States or by sub-State actors.   It is, however, appreciated 
that the action plan adopted by the OPCW has required significant resources from the 
Technical Secretariat and comparable resources are currently not available for the 
States Parties to the BTWC. 
 
38.  As recognised by SCR 1540 (2004) in its seventh operative paragraph, States 
may require assistance to implement this resolution: 
 
7. Recognizes that some States may require assistance in implementing the 
provisions of this resolution within their territories and invites States in a 
position to do so to offer assistance as appropriate in response to specific 
requests to the States lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, 
implementation experience and/or resources for fulfilling the above 
provisions; 
 
Consequently, at the Sixth Review Conference particular attention should be given to 
seeking a commitment from those States Parties in a position to do so to provide 
assistance to States Parties requiring such assistance in developing and adopting 
national implementation legislation.   
 
39.  Although there may be some consideration to whether to adopt an action plan, it 
would be wise to adopt different terminology as the resources provided by the OPCW 
to support the CWC Article VII national implementation action plan will not be 
available.  It is suggested that an achievement timeline which sets a target for two 
thirds of the States Parties to the BTWC to have adopted national implementation 
legislation by the time of the Seventh Review Conference would be an effective and 
desirable outcome.   It would be greatly aided by one or more States Parties 
undertaking to provide resources to facilitate the adoption of legislation by States 
Parties as well as to monitor and report to the States Parties annually on progress 
towards this target.   Such a progress report would be appropriate at future annual 
Meetings of the States Parties at which agreement could be reached on additional 
action should that be necessary.” 
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34. Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1623 in March 2006 also addressed the subject of 
the Confidence-Building Measures: 
 
“43.  The States Parties agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986 to submit 
information annually under Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).  The CBMs were 
reviewed and extended at the Third Review Conference in 199124: 
 
In accordance with the decision of the Second Review Conference, and taking 
into account views expressed concerning the need to strengthen the 
implementation of the provisions of Article V, the Conference reviewed the 
effectiveness of the provisions in Article V for consultation and cooperation 
and of the cooperative measures agreed in the Final Declaration of the 
Second Review Conference, and considered whether or not further actions 
were called for to create further cooperative measures. The Conference came 
to the following conclusions and recommendations: 
 
The Conference notes the importance of the confidence-building measures 
agreed upon at the Second Review Conference, as well as the modalities 
elaborated by the Ad Hoc Meeting of the Scientific and Technical Experts 
from States parties to the Convention held in 1987. The Conference recognizes 
the exchange of information that took place on this agreed basis between 1987 
and 1991. The Conference urges all States parties to submit information to 
future rounds of information exchange. 
 
With a view to promoting increased participation and strengthening further 
the exchange of information, the Conference agrees to reaffirm those 
measures established at the Second Review Conference with the following 
improvements: to add a declaration on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new 
to declare"; to amend and extend the exchange of data on research centres 
and laboratories; to amend the exchange of information on outbreaks of 
infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; to amend the 
measure for the active promotion of contacts; and to add three new 
confidence-building measures entitled "Declaration of legislation, regulations 
and other measures"; "Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or 
defensive biological research development programmes"; and "Declaration of 
vaccine production facilities". 
 
Accordingly, the Conference, mindful of the provisions of Article V and Article 
X, and determined to strengthen the authority of the Convention and to 
enhance confidence in the implementation of its provisions, agrees that the 
States parties are to implement, on the basis of mutual cooperation, the 
following measures set out in the annex to this Final Declaration, in order to 
prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions, and 
                                                 
23 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
24 United Nations, Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 9 – 27 September 1991. Final Document, BWC/CONF.III/23, 1991. Available at: 
http://www.opbw.org 
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in order to improve international cooperation in the field of peaceful 
bacteriological (biological) activities: 
 
1. Declaration form on "Nothing to declare" or "Nothing new to 
declare" 
 
2. Confidence-building measure "A": 
 
- Part1: Exchange of data on research centres and 
laboratories; 
 
- Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological 
defence research and development programmes. 
 
3. Confidence-building measure "B": 
 
- Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases 
and similar occurrences caused by toxins. 
 
4. Confidence-building measure "C": 
 
- Encouragement of publication of results and promotion of use 
of knowledge. 
 
5. Confidence-building measure "D": 
 
- Active promotion of contacts. 
 
6. Confidence-building measure "E": 
 
- Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures. 
 
7. Confidence-building measure "F": 
 
- Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive 
biological research and development programmes. 
 
8. Confidence-building measure "G": 
 
- Declaration of vaccine production facilities. 
 
The Conference also agrees that the exchange of information and data, using 
the revised forms, be sent to the United Nations Department for Disarmament 
Affairs no later than 15 April on an annual basis and should cover the 
previous calendar year. 
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44.  At the Fourth Review Conference25, the States Parties did not carry out a detailed 
review of the CBMs as they were aware that the Ad Hoc Group was then engaged in 
considering the incorporation of existing and further enhanced CBMs into a regime to 
strengthen the Convention: 
 
5. The Conference notes the background information document prepared 
by the United Nations Secretary-General providing data on the participation 
of States Parties in the agreed confidence-building measures since the Third 
Review Conference.  The Conference welcomes the exchange of information 
carried out under the confidence-building measures, and notes that this has 
contributed to enhancing transparency and building confidence.  The 
Conference recognizes that participation in the confidence-building measures 
since the last Review Conference has not been universal, and that not all 
responses have been prompt or complete.  In this regard, the Conference also 
recognizes the technical difficulties experienced by some States Parties with 
respect to preparing CBM responses.  In this regard, the Conference urges all 
States Parties to complete full and timely declarations in the future.  The 
Conference notes that the Ad Hoc Group of States Parties established by the 
Special Conference in 1994 is, as part of its continuing work, considering the 
incorporation of existing and further enhanced confidence-building and 
transparency measures, as appropriate, in a regime to strengthen the 
Convention. 
 
45.  At the Fifth Review Conference, a number of useful proposals to strengthen the 
CBMs were submitted by South Africa26.   These are well worth further consideration, 
along with other ideas for improving the responses from the States Parties in their 
annual submissions of CBM returns, at the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference in 
November/December 2006.  Consideration needs to be given to a review of the 
existing CBMs and their format; proposals for new CBMs; provision for electronic 
submission and circulation; collation, translation and elaboration procedures; and the 
provision of assistance, where requested.  It needs, however, to be considered whether 
there will be sufficient time at the Sixth Review Conference to consider the details of 
the existing CBMs and how they might be improved.  It should be recalled that at the 
Second Review Conference in 1986 the States Parties agreed to hold an ad hoc 
meeting in 1987 of scientific and technical experts from States Parties to finalise the 
modalities for the exchange of information and data by working out, inter alia, 
appropriate forms to be used by States Parties for the exchange of information agreed 
to in this Final Declaration, thus enabling States Parties to follow a standardised 
procedure.  
 
                                                 
25 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
26 South Africa, Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001. Strengthening Confidence-Building Measures Working 
Paper by South Africa, BWC/CONF.V/COW/WP.1, 16 November 2001. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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46.  There would be merit in the States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference 
agreeing that a Meeting of States Parties should be held in 2007 to consider and 
decide how to improve the effectiveness of the CBM process with this Meeting being 
prepared for by an earlier two week Meeting of Experts. The Meeting of Experts on 
CBMs to prepare for the annual Meeting would provide an opportunity for States 
Parties to share best practice in compiling annual CBM returns and identifying how 
the effectiveness of the CBM process might best be improved.  It is evident from the 
experience gained during the period from 2003 to 2005 that the process of annual one 
week Meetings of States Parties prepared by an earlier two week Meeting of Experts 
has worked well and been effective in achieving a good exchange of information.” 
 
35. Recommendation 32 made by the WMDC has consequently been further developed by 
the Bradford Review Conference paper No. 16 in regard to both national implementation and 
Confidence-Building Measures. 
 
Institutional Deficit 
 
36.  The WMDC report in its next section then addresses the institutional deficit of the 
BTWC.  Although the report notes that over the years there have been various attempts to 
address this institutional deficit it fails to mention the near-miss at the Third Review 
Conference when on the final day, 27 September 1991, proposals for a two-person secretariat 
support unit collapsed.  Nicholas Sims has recently summarised the remedies for the 
institutional deficit of the BTWC in Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1227 in March 
2005.  
 
37.  Recommendations 33 and 34.  The WMDC report at the end of this section makes its 
third and fourth recommendations in the field of biological and toxin weapons: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 33 
 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should enhance the 
investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-General, ensuring that the Secretary-
General’s office can rely upon a regularly up-dated roster of experts and advice from 
the World Health Organization and a specialist unit, modelled on the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, to assist in investigating 
unusual outbreaks of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons. 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 34 
 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should establish a 
standing secretariat to handle organizational and administrative matters related to 
the treaty, such as Review Conferences and expert meetings. 
 
38.  There is no background to WMDC Recommendation 33 in this section of the WMDC 
report apart from a mention of “the UN Secretary-General’s mechanism to investigate 
allegations of breaches of the 1925 Geneva Protocol;” which is listed as an example of an 
                                                 
27 Nicholas A. Sims, Remedies for the Institutional Deficit of the BTWC: Proposals for the Sixth Review 
Conference, Review Conference Paper No. 12, March 2005, University of Bradford, Department of Peace 
Studies.  Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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attempt to address the institutional deficit.   However the subject of the investigation of the 
alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease was one of the 
topics considered by the States Parties to the BTWC at the annual Meeting of Experts and 
subsequent Meeting of States Parties in 2004.  Consequently, the Sixth Review Conference is 
expected to consider effective action on this topic – and hence the WMDC recommendation 
is timely. 
 
39.  Both of these recommendations are strongly supported.  However, Recommendation 33 
is ambiguous in its wording that the Secretary-General’s office can rely upon a regularly up-
dated roster of experts and advice from the World Health Organization and a specialist unit, 
as it is unclear as to where the experts are to come from:  from member States of the United 
Nations (as in the present, now somewhat dated, arrangements) or from the World Health 
Organization or from the WHO and a specialist unit modeled on UNMOVIC.   It would be 
clearer and more effective if the recommendation were to be reworded as follows in which 
new wording is in bold: 
 
 States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should enhance the 
investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-General, ensuring that the Secretary-
General’s office can rely upon a regularly up-dated roster of trained experts drawn 
from member States and advice from the World Health Organization, the World 
Organization for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
together with a specialist unit, modelled on the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission, to assist in investigating unusual outbreaks 
of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons. 
 
An important point is that a key lesson28 of both UNSCOM and particularly, UNMOVIC, is 
the importance of a roster of trained experts.  It is also important that because attacks of 
biological weapons may be against humans, animals and plants that advice is sought from the 
WHO, OIE and FAO. 
 
40. Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1629 in March 2006 included the following 
paragraphs on the subject of investigations of the alleged use of biological or toxin weapons: 
 
“Article VI Investigations 
 
52.    The States Parties at the Fourth Review Conference agreed in their Final 
Declaration30 under Article VI that: 
 
2. The Conference reaffirms the importance of Article VI, which, in 
addition to the procedures contained in Article V, provides that any State 
Party which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of its 
                                                 
28 Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; Inspection, Verification and Non-
Proliferation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
29 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
30 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
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obligations under the Convention may lodge a complaint with the United 
Nations Security Council.  The Conference notes that the provisions of Article 
VI will be taken into account, as appropriate, for any future verification 
regime resulting from the consideration by the Ad Hoc Group of a system of 
measures to promote compliance with the Convention.  The Conference 
emphasizes the provision of Article VI that such a complaint should include all 
possible evidence confirming its validity.  It stresses that, as in the case of the 
implementation of all the provisions and procedures set forth in the 
Convention, the procedures foreseen in Article VI should be implemented in 
good faith within the scope of the Convention. 
 
53.  In addition, the Final Declaration also included: 
 
4. The Conference recalls, in this context, United Nations Security 
Council resolution 620 (1988), which at the time encouraged the United 
Nations Secretary-General to carry out prompt investigations, in response to 
allegations brought to its attention by any Member State concerning the 
possible use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons 
that could entail a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or of any other 
applicable rule of international treaty or customary law.  The Conference also 
recalls the technical guidelines and procedures contained in Annex I of 
United Nations document A/44/561 to guide the United Nations Secretary-
General on the timely and efficient investigation of reports of the possible use 
of such weapons.  The States Parties reaffirm their agreement to consult, at 
the request of any State Party, regarding allegations of use or threat of use of 
bacteriological (biological) or toxin weapons and to cooperate fully with the 
United Nations Secretary -General in carrying out such investigations.  The 
Conference stresses that in the case of alleged use the United Nations is called 
upon to take appropriate measures expeditiously, which could include a 
request to the Security Council to consider action in accordance with the 
Charter. 
 
54.   In addition, the States Parties at their annual meetings in 2004 considered the 
topic: 
 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons 
or suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
and in their Report31 they agreed: 
 
20. On the mandate to discuss, and promote common understanding and 
effective action on enhancing international capabilities for responding to, 
investigating and mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or 
toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease, the States Parties 
recognised that: 
                                                 
31 United Nations, Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their Destruction, 
Second Meeting, Geneva, 6 – 10 December 2004. Report of the Meeting of States Parties, BWC/MSP/2004/3, 
14 December 2004. Available at: http://www.opbw.org 
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a) capabilities for responding to, investigating and mitigating the effects of 
cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of 
disease promote the object and purpose of the Convention; 
 
b) States Parties’ national preparedness and arrangements substantially 
contribute to international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
c) the Secretary-General’s investigation mechanism, set out in A/44/561 and 
endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution A/Res/45/57, represents an 
international institutional mechanism for investigating cases of alleged use of 
biological or toxin weapons. 
 
21. The States Parties consequently agreed on the value of: 
 
a) continuing to develop their own national capacities for response, 
investigation and mitigation, in cooperation with the relevant international 
and regional organisations, and, if in a position to do so, assisting and 
encouraging, with the necessary agreement, other States Parties to do the 
same; 
 
b) the Sixth Review Conference considering, inter alia, the further 
development of current procedures for the provision of assistance, by those in 
a position to do so, to States Parties in cases of alleged use of biological 
weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease. 
 
55.  As reported32 at the time, the draft outcome paper for the December 2004 
Meeting of States Parties had initially contained the following: 
 
(b) that consideration should be given to reviewing the Secretary-General’s 
mechanism for investigation of cases of alleged use of biological and toxin 
weapons and to invite the Secretary-General to report to the Sixth Review 
Conference on any actions that may be taken in this regard on the basis of 
consideration by the United Nations General Assembly. 
 
However, consensus could not be found on this language or on a development thereof.  
Consequently, all consideration has to be deferred to the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
56.  At the Sixth Review Conference, it is recommended that consideration be given 
to two aspects relating to Article VI Investigations.  The first is that the States Parties 
should consider developing the modalities of the procedure implicit in the first 
paragraph of Article VI of the Convention which states that: 
 
(1) Any State Party to this convention which finds that any other State Party is 
acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention 
                                                 
32 Graham S. Pearson, The Biological Weapons Convention Meeting of States Parties, in The CBW Conventions 
Bulletin, Issue no 66, December 2004, pp. 21-34.  Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp 
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may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a 
complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well 
as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.  
 
(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to cooperate in carrying 
out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the 
complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the 
States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.  
 
The modalities of the procedure implicit in the first paragraph might be elaborated 
along the following lines: 
 
1.  The State Party lodging a complaint should identify which obligation under 
the Convention it considers has been breached and in what manner the breach 
has occurred. 
 
2.  The State Party lodging the complaint should compile a report containing 
all possible evidence relating to the alleged breach of obligations and the 
evidence therein should be validated to the extent possible. 
 
3.  The State Party lodging a compliant should implement the procedure as 
soon as possible after the alleged breach of the obligations under the 
Convention has taken place. 
 
57.  Secondly, the States Parties should recognise that it is in the interests of all States 
Parties to the BTWC to ensure that any investigation that may be carried out is both 
effective and credible.  Consequently, the States Parties should consider what steps 
are needed to ensure that the Secretary-General’s mechanism for the investigation of 
cases of alleged use of biological and toxin weapons would indeed be effective and 
credible.  There has been significant developments since the Secretary-General’s 
mechanism was first set up – for example, the OPCW has set up its mechanism for 
investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons and UNMOVIC has developed its 
procedures for investigations.  In both cases, the importance of trained experts and of 
accredited laboratories that have validated procedures for the analysis of samples have 
been recognised.  The Secretary-General’s mechanism has neither and is therefore 
seriously lagging in regard to the current internationally expected standard. “ 
 
41. Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 1633 in March 2006 included a short paragraph 
on the subject of institutional support: 
 
“Institutional Support 
 
66.  The States Parties at the Sixth Review Conference should consider agreeing to 
the setting up of a small interim institutional support to facilitate the annual meetings 
                                                 
33 Graham S. Pearson & Nicholas A. Sims, Successful Outcomes for the BTWC Sixth Review Conference, 
Review Conference Paper No. 16, March 2006, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  
Available at http:www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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held during 2007 to 2011 between the Sixth and the Seventh Review Conferences and 
also to help States Parties with implementation. “ 
 
42.  Both WMDC recommendations 33 and 34 have thus been addressed also in Bradford 
Review Conference Paper No. 16 with the topic of investigations of alleged use being 
developed further.   
 
Implementation of the Convention 
 
43.  The next section of the WMDC report addresses the implementation of the Convention.  
The first paragraph correctly points out the need to strengthen the effectiveness and improve 
the implementation of the Convention and to make a fresh start: 
 
States parties should also agree to consider ways and means to strengthen the 
effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BTWC by adopting a substantive 
programme of work for the five years following the 2006 Review Conference, starting 
with regular annual meetings from 2007. It is time for all states parties to make a 
fresh start and not be distracted by previous disagreements. 
 
44.  The subsequent paragraphs include sentences that are not clearly expressed and reflect a 
lack of expert knowledge in the field.  Thus the second paragraph in this section states: 
 
As noted above, nowadays the transport of goods and relative ease of international 
travel mean that an outbreak of a transmissible disease in one place could spread 
quickly throughout the world. Inevitably, scientific advancements in biotechnology 
and the widespread availability of facilities capable of producing biological agents 
make it more difficult to prevent the development of biological weapons and 
complicate efforts to ensure their non-production and the elimination of stocks. 
 
The first sentence accurately reflects the current situation.  The second confuses biological 
weapons and life sciences capabilities and appears to fail to recognise the significance of the 
general purpose criterion which was mentioned in the second section of the WMDC report 
entitled Prohibition of Biological Weapons which noted that: 
 
The Convention embodies the principle known as the general purpose criterion under 
which all relevant activities are prohibited unless they can be justified for the 
peaceful purposes permitted under the Convention, including justifications relating to 
types and quantities of materials being used for prophylactic, protective or other 
peaceful purposes. 
 
The general purpose criterion is embodied in Article I of the Convention which sets out the 
fundamental prohibition as being as follows: 
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to 
develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:  
 
(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or 
method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for 
prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;  
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(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or 
toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  
 
This makes it clear that each State Party has undertaken never in any circumstances to have 
microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. 
 
45.  The WMDC sentence also refers to the elimination of stocks which is somewhat 
surprising given that no State Party to the BTWC, unlike the situation in regard to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), has declared any stocks of biological weapons or 
agents.    
 
46.  The WMDC report statement would consequently have been better recast along the 
following lines (changes shown in bold): 
 
. Inevitably, scientific advancements in biotechnology and the widespread availability 
of facilities capable of producing biological materials make transparency of such 
activities and their declaration by all States Parties in the annual Confidence-
Building Measures all the more important as well as emphasizing the need to 
further strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the 
Convention.   
 
47.  The first sentence in the next paragraph in this section calls for putting in place measures 
for early discovery and for alerting the public quickly and effectively.  It is not clear what is 
meant by early discovery:  it would have been clearer and more accurate to have referred to 
putting in place measures for early identification of a deliberate outbreak. 
 
48.  The fifth paragraph in this section again brings in a confusing mention of stocks in the 
phrase plus urgent international cooperation to destroy left-over and unwanted stocks.    As 
mentioned above, no State Party has declared any stocks and this clause appears to reflect the 
situation in the CWC where there are indeed left-over and unwanted stocks of chemical 
weapons. 
 
49.   Recommendation 35.    This section concludes with the fifth recommendation of the 
WMDC in the field of biological and toxin weapons: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 35 
 
Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective monitoring 
of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of coordinating 
international responses to any major event that might involve bioweapons. They 
should strengthen cooperation between civilian health and security-oriented 
authorities, nationally, regionally and worldwide, including in the framework of the 
new International Health Regulations of the World Health Organization. 
Governments should also review their national biosafety and biosecurity measures to 
protect health and the environment from the release of biological and toxin materials. 
They should harmonize national biosecurity standards. 
 
This recommendation can be strongly supported although the third line would have been 
clearer and better expressed had it referred to: 
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 … international responses to any major outbreaks whether natural or deliberate. 
 
Such an approach is the one recommended by the World Health Organization in its advice 
Public health response to biological and chemical weapons:  WHO Guidance34. 
 
50.  No background is given in this section of the WMDC report to some of the elements of 
this recommendation such as those relating to national biosafety and biosecurity measures 
and the harmonizing of national biosecurity standards.  They do, however, reflect 
considerations at the annual Meeting of Experts and the subsequent Meeting of States Parties 
in 2003 when the topics considered were: 
 
i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth 
in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; 
 
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
  
The outcome of the Meeting of States Parties in 2003 was much less focussed than from the 
subsequent annual Meetings in 2004 and 2005.  Nevertheless, in 2003 the States Parties 
agreed that: 
 
At the Meeting of States Parties, States Parties noted that notwithstanding the 
differing legal and constitutional arrangements among the 151 States Parties to the 
Convention, States have adopted similar basic approaches and share common 
principles. The States Parties stressed the need for undertaking activities at the 
national level in keeping with their obligations and responsibilities to strengthen and 
implement the Convention. The States Parties agreed, to that end, on the value of the 
following: 
 
To review, and where necessary, enact or update national legal, including 
regulatory and penal, measures which ensure effective implementation of the 
prohibition of the Convention, and which enhance effective security of 
pathogens and toxins. 
 
The positive effect of cooperation between States Parties with differing legal 
and constitutional arrangements. States Parties in a position to do so may 
wish to provide legal and technical assistance to others who request it in 
framing and/or expanding their own legislation and controls in the areas of 
national implementation and biosecurity. 
 
The need for comprehensive and concrete national measures to secure 
pathogen collections and the control of their use for peaceful purposes. There 
was a general recognition of the value of biosecurity measures and 
procedures, which will ensure that such dangerous materials are not 
accessible to persons who might or could misuse them for purposes contrary 
to the Convention. 
                                                 
34 World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons:  WHO Guidance, 
2004.  Available at http://www.who.int/csr/delibepidemics/biochemguide/en/index.html 
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States Parties considered that agreement on the value of these measures discussed at 
the Meeting constitutes an essential effort to facilitate more effective implementation 
and enforcement of the Convention, as well as providing a basis for review of 
progress at the 2006 Review Conference. 
 
As the outcomes of the annual Meetings of States Parties will be considered by the Sixth 
Review Conference which will decide on any further action, it is timely and appropriate for 
the WMDC recommendations with their focus on the Sixth Review Conference to emphasise 
these points. 
 
Life Sciences and the Role of Scientists  
 
51.  The final section of the WMDC report in the area of biological and toxin weapons 
addresses life sciences and the role of scientists.   The first paragraph sets the scene by saying 
that: 
 
Devising measures to strengthen individual responsibility in scientific research 
involves a delicate balance between the legitimate quest for new knowledge, 
especially in fields where advances can greatly enhance medical and other kinds of 
peaceful developments, and the dangers to society inherent in certain kinds of work. 
 
It does, however, put undue emphasis on research (the points made earlier in paragraph 19 
are applicable) as well as on the individual when the organisation within which the individual 
equally needs to be aware of the dangers to society inherent in certain kinds of work. 
 
52.  The third paragraph uses some surprisingly inaccurate words in its call to all countries 
and competent institutions to provide bioweapon awareness training for biologists and 
biotechnologists working in the public and private sectors.   The requirement is surely not to 
make biologists and biotechnologists aware of biological weapons but rather to make them 
aware of how work in the life sciences might be misused and the fact that such misuse is 
totally prohibited by both the BTWC and increasingly, by national legislation.  One of the 
key findings from the recent work35 by Malcolm Dando and Brian Rappert in seminars held 
in the UK, Germany and the United States has been the lack of awareness of those engaged in 
the life sciences of the prohibitions of the BTWC and that such misuse of the life sciences is 
illegal.  
 
53.   The same paragraph goes on to consider codes of ethics, codes of conduct and codes of 
practice.  The sentences relating to codes of conduct and to codes of practice state that; 
 
Codes of conduct or codes of practice, in contrast, are envisaged more as a 
professional guide to good practice that would be part of science education from 
secondary school to university and professional training, to raise awareness of the 
moral issues as well as instilling good practices for maintaining the security of 
materials, facilities and sensitive technologies. 
 
                                                 
35 Malcolm R. Dando and Brian Rappert, Codes of Conduct for the Life Sciences:  Some Insights from UK 
Academia, Bradford Briefing Paper No. 16 (Second Series), May 2005, University of Bradford, Department of 
Peace Studies. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc Malcolm R. Dando, Private communication, June 
2006. 
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This appreciation is unfortunately incomplete as it appears to focus solely on codes within 
education.   It overlooks the fact that in some countries codes of practice are an integral part 
of the national regulations that, for example, control health and safety.   Such codes of 
practice are consequently an integral part of all activities carried out by facilities whether in 
academia, industry or government.   It has been argued that is such codes were extended to 
include consideration of whether a planned activity presented a risk to the prohibitions under 
the BTWC this would be a highly effective way of ensuring that such considerations were 
taken into account on a continuing basis.  The UK Royal Society in June 2005 issued a Policy 
Statement36 that said: 
 
Codes building on existing regulation and legislation  
 
Many  valuable  guidelines  and  principles  for  the  professional  conduct  of 
 scientists  already  exist  at  organisational,  national  and  international  level. 
 These  could  be  extended  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  misuse  of  scientific 
 research.  Existing  guidelines  and  principles  should  be  used  as  the  basis  for 
 any  codes  where  possible,  rather  than  starting  from  first  principles.  It  has 
 been  suggested  that  the  requirements  of  the  risk  assessment  process  included 
 in  the  health  and  safety  regulations  could be  widened  slightly  to  ensure  that 
 the  proposed  activity  does  not  present  a  risk  to  the  prohibitions  enshrined  in 
 the  BTWC  (Pearson  2005)37.  Introducing  extended  codes  of  conduct  or 
 practice  based  on  existing  health  and  safety  regulations  provides  an 
 opportunity  for education  and  training  to  reinforce  these  regulations.  Such 
 codes  would  need  to  be  consulted  before  any  new  work  was  conducted  and  at 
 key  stages  during  the  project.  This  type  of  code  has  more  value  than  one  that 
 would  be  consulted  only  on  one  occasion,  such  as  during  training  on  joining 
 an  organisation  or  when  signing  a  contract  of  employment.    
 
This pointed out the value of working from existing codes of practice where possible and the 
greater value of codes that would be consulted on more than one occasion. 
 
54.  Recommendation 36.   This section ends with the sixth and final WMDC 
recommendation in the field of biological and toxin weapons:    
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 36 
 
At the Sixth Review Conference, in 2006, the states parties to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention should reaffirm common understandings reached at 
previous review conferences and take action on all subjects addressed at Convention 
meetings since 2003. They should also establish a work programme on additional 
topics for future meetings. States parties should ensure more frequent reassessment of 
the implications of scientific and technological developments and reaffirm that all 
undertakings under Article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention apply 
to such developments. This Review Conference should reaffirm that all developments 
                                                 
36 Royal Society, The role of codes of conduct in preventing the misuse of scientific research, RS policy 
document 03/05, June 2005.  Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=13648 
37 Graham S. Pearson, A Code of Conduct for the Life Sciences: A Practical Approach, Bradford Briefing Paper 
No. 15 (Second Series), November 2004, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies. Available at 
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc
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in the life sciences fall within the scope of the Convention and that all developments 
in the life sciences for hostile purposes are prohibited by the Convention. 
 
55.  The first and second sentences are strongly supported.   There is a real need for the States 
Parties to the BTWC to reaffirm and extend the extended understandings agreed at previous 
Review Conferences.  There is also a clear need for a further series of annual meetings during 
the intersessional years from 2006 until 2011, when the Seventh Review Conference should 
be held.   The process of annual Meetings of States Parties prepared for by a previous 
Meeting of Experts usually some four or five months before the Meeting of States Parties has 
worked well as the four or five month interval has provided sufficient time for the States 
Parties to deliberate on the outcome of the Meeting of Experts.  However, consideration 
should be given to creating a situation in which the annual Meeting of States Parties can take 
decisions and can also decide to hold additional meetings in subsequent years on additional 
topics as appropriate.  Furthermore, the annual Meeting of States Parties should receive a 
report on the progress thus far towards universal adherence to the Convention and on 
progress in regard to national implementation of the Convention and be able to agree on 
appropriate action to facilitate further progress. 
 
56.  The recommendations in the third and fourth sentences are to some extent repetitive and 
no background is provided to these aspects of the recommendation in this section of the 
WMDC report.   The background is that successive Review Conferences have, as required by 
Article XII of the Convention that includes the requirement that: 
 
 Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention. 
 
carried out a review of recent scientific and technological developments relevant to the 
Convention.  This has led to the adoption of language in the Article I section of the Final 
Declaration that reaffirms that the undertaking given by States Parties in Article I of the 
Convention applies to all such developments.  The language adopted at the Fourth Review 
Conference in 1996 stated38: 
 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the fields of microbiology, 
biotechnology, molecular biology, genetic engineering, and any applications resulting 
from genome studies, and the possibilities of their use for purposes inconsistent with 
the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, reaffirms that the undertaking 
given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. 
 
57.  In the Bradford Briefing Book39 for the Fifth Review Conference issued in November 
2001, the chapter40 on Article I summarized the situation in regard to scientific and 
technological changes as follows: 
                                                 
38 United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxins Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 25 November – 6 December 1996. Final Document, BWC/CONF.IV/9, 1996. Available 
at: http://www.opbw.org 
39 Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & Nicholas A. Sims (editors), Key Points for the Fifth Review 
Conference, November 2001, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  Available at 
http;//www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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“The Impact of Scientific and Technological Changes 
 
38. States Parties will wish to reaffirm that the scope of the Convention covers all 
scientific and technological developments.  However, as the genomics revolution 
enters the consolidation phase and major developments are taking place across the 
whole range of biology and medicine at an increasing pace, it would be desirable to 
provide further reaffirmation that all such developments are embraced by the 
Convention. 
 
39. Three particular issues should be considered important enough to be addressed 
through the addition of new language.  First, it is clear that the scientific and 
technological developments that could be of concern apply to animals and plants as 
well as to human beings.  Second, as the genomics revolution is impacting on all 
aspects of biology and medicine, the process of adding discrete new topics that are 
causing apprehension could be misleading.  It would be clearer and better to use 
language making it clear that developments throughout the whole of the life sciences 
could potentially be of concern.   This could then be complemented with an 
explanatory sentence mentioning some of the specific recent areas in which 
significant advances have occurred along the lines of "Consequently, genomics, 
proteomics and bioinformatics are covered." 
  
40. These first two issues could be addressed by amending the sixth paragraph from 
the Fourth Review Conference so that it reads: 
 
6. The Conference, conscious of apprehensions arising from relevant scientific 
and technological developments, inter alia, in the life sciences in animals and 
plants as well as in humans, and the possibilities of their use for purposes 
inconsistent with the objectives and the provisions of the Convention, 
reaffirms that the undertakings given by the States Parties in Article I applies 
to all such developments. Consequently, genomics, proteomics and 
bioinformatics are covered. 
 
These additions highlighted above would make it clear that humans, animals and 
plants were all protected by the prohibition and remove any uncertainty as to the 
relative importance of different aspects of the life sciences for the prohibition. 
 
41. Thirdly, in view of growing knowledge of the dangers of prion diseases, the 
increasing capabilities for manipulation of receptors and ligands in the nervous, 
endocrine and immune systems, and the growing understanding of how proteins may 
be designed for particular purposes, the States Parties are recommended to extend the 
fifth paragraph of the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference.  As with 
the addition of an explanatory sentence on toxins in the Final Declaration41 of the 
Second Review Conference which read that: 
                                                                                                                                                        
40 Malcolm R. Dando & Simon Whitby, Article I – Scope, in Graham S. Pearson, Malcolm R. Dando & 
Nicholas A. Sims (editors), Key Points for the Fifth Review Conference, November 2001, University of 
Bradford, Department of Peace Studies.  Available at http;//www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
41United Nations, Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) 
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The Conference reaffirms that the Convention unequivocally applies to all 
natural or artificially created microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
whatever their origin or method of production.  Consequently, toxins (both 
proteinaceous and non-proteinaceous) of a microbial, animal or vegetable 
nature and their synthetically produced analogues are covered. 
 
it is recommended that an explanatory sentence should be added at this Review 
Conference on prions, bioregulators and proteins.  The text would then read: 
 
5. The  Conference also reaffirms that the Convention covers all microbial or 
other biological agents or toxins, naturally or artificially created or altered, 
as well as their components, whatever their origin or method of production, of 
types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective 
or other peaceful purposes.  Consequently, prions, proteins and 
bioregulators and their synthetically produced analogues and components 
are covered. 
 
The additional sentence would eliminate any doubt as to the scope of the Convention 
in covering these rapidly developing fields of the life sciences.” 
 
58.  The question of more frequent reassessment of the implications of scientific and 
technological developments proposed by the WMDC requires some consideration.   The 
requirement is for a technical evaluation of the implications of scientific and technological 
developments followed by a reaffirmation by the States Parties, as at the Fourth Review 
Conference, that the undertaking given by the States Parties in Article I applies to all such 
developments.   The requirement is for a mechanism to achieve this:  it could be achieved by 
a Meeting of Experts which evaluated the implications of scientific and technological 
developments relevant to the Convention that was then followed a few months later by a 
Meeting of States Parties with the authority to reaffirm that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments.   With such an understanding, the 
concept expressed in the third and fourth sentences of the WMDC recommendation 36 are 
strongly supported. 
 
Other Relevant WMDC Recommendations 
 
59.  As noted above in paragraph 13 of this Review Conference Paper, other sections of the 
WMDC report include general recommendations that are applicable to biological and toxin 
weapons issues.  These are now considered in turn.  First the section on Export Controls, 
International Assistance, and Non-Governmental Actors has six such recommendations; 47, 
49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 and the section on Compliance, Verification, Enforcement and the Role 
of the United Nations has three such recommendations: 56, 57 and 60.  
 
60.  Recommendation 47.   This recommendation addresses export-control regimes and 
states that: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 47 
                                                                                                                                                        
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, 8th - 26th September 1986, Final Declaration, 
BWC/CONF.II/13/II, Geneva, 1986. 
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All states should conduct audits of their export control enforcement agencies 
(customs, police, coastguard, border control and military) to ensure that they can 
carry out their tasks effectively. States should seek to establish a universal system of 
export controls providing harmonized standards, enhanced transparency and 
practical support for implementation. Members of the five export control regimes [the 
Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement] should promote a 
widening of their membership and improve implementation in view of current security 
challenges, without impeding legitimate trade and economic development. 
 
This recommendation can be strongly supported especially when it is recognized that there 
are numerous other export control regimes such as the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) regime 
for toxic and banned chemicals, the Persistent Organic Pollutants (POP) regime and the 
Biosafety Protocol requirements for Advance Informed Agreement (AIA) prior to transfers of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs).   The universal system proposed by the WMDC 
should include both security and health and safety material transfer regimes. 
 
61.  Recommendation 49.   This is an excellent recommendation that addresses the 
responsibilities of industrial companies: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 49 
 
Companies engaged in activities relevant to weapons of mass destruction have the 
ability and responsibility to help prevent the proliferation of such weapons and an 
interest in demonstrating that they are fulfilling that responsibility, including full 
compliance with national and international obligations and public transparency.  
Trade associations should promote such objectives. 
 
This recommendation is strongly supported. 
 
62.  Recommendation 50.  This relates to codes of practice and codes of conduct: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 50 
 
States, international organizations and professional associations should encourage 
the appropriate academic and industrial associations to adopt and effectively 
implement codes of practice and codes of conduct for science and research in 
weapons of mass destruction-relevant fields. 
 
This recommendation is surprisingly curtailed in its scope as it fails to address government 
facilities engaged in activities in weapons of mass destruction fields.  The WMDC has again 
placed emphasis inappropriately on research – the focus throughout should be on all activities 
whether in academia, industry or government.  Recommendation 50 would be better 
rephrased to read as follows (bold to show changes): 
 
States, international organizations and professional associations should encourage 
all those engaged in activities in weapons of mass destruction-relevant fields whether 
in academia, industry or government to adopt and effectively implement codes of 
practice and codes of conduct for all such activities. Appropriate academic, 
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professional and industrial associations should encourage the adoption of such 
codes of conduct or practice. 
 
With such amendment, the recommendation is strongly supported. 
 
63. Recommendation 51.  This relates to the informing of and involvement of parliaments: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 51 
 
Governments possessing any weapons of mass destruction should keep their 
parliaments fully and currently informed of their holdings of such weapons and their 
activities to reduce and eliminate them. Parliaments should actively seek such 
information and recognize their responsibility in formulating policies relevant to 
weapons of mass destruction issues. Greater inter-parliamentary cooperation on 
weapons of mass destruction issues is needed. 
 
This recommendation does not apply to biological and toxin weapons as no State Party to the 
BTWC has admitted to possessing such weapons. 
 
64. Recommendation 52.  This relates to the involvement on NGOs: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 52 
 
States should assist Non-Governmental Organizations to actively participate in 
international meetings and conferences, and to inform and campaign in the weapons 
of mass destruction field.  Private foundations should substantially increase their 
support for such organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass 
destruction threats. 
 
This recommendation is strongly supported.   
 
65.  Recommendation 53.   This relates to education and informed public debate: 
 
 WMDC RECOMMENDATION 53 
 
Organizations with security-relevant agendas should re-examine the 2002 United 
Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, and should 
consider ways in which they could foster and support such education and an informed 
public debate. Governments should fund student internships at multilateral 
institutions working on weapons of mass destruction issues. 
 
66.  The 2002 United Nations Study42 was carried out by governmental experts appointed by 
the UN Secretary-General from  the  following 10 States: Egypt, Hungary, India,  Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Poland, Senegal and Sweden.  The study was carried out as a 
                                                 
42 United Nations, United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education Report of the 
Secretary-General, A/57/124, 30 August 2002.  Available at http://www.un.ods 
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result of General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/33 E43 adopted on 20 November 2000 
which had as its first paragraph: 
 
The General Assembly 
 
Desirous of stressing the urgency of promoting concerted international efforts at 
disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the field of nuclear weapons and 
other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, with a view to 
strengthening international security and enhancing sustainable economic and social 
development, 
 
 The Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico was the Chairman of the group. Although this study 
does include one mention of ‘biological weapons’, this comes in the first paragraph of its 
introduction: 
 
Science and technology transformed the world in the twentieth century. Living 
standards improved but warfare was rendered more deadly. Weapons of mass 
destruction - biological, chemical and nuclear – and their means of delivery were 
developed, as ever more sophisticated conventional armaments were produced and 
disseminated. The horrors and destruction of armed conflict persist. The need for 
disarmament and nonproliferation education and training has never been greater. 
Indeed, changing concepts and perceptions of security and threat magnify the 
urgency for new thinking to pursue disarmament and non-proliferation goals. 
 
The study consequently focuses weapons of mass destruction in general and arrives at 34 
recommendations with 20 under the heading “Ways to promote education and training in 
disarmament and non-proliferation at all levels of formal and informal education”, 6 under 
the heading “Ways to utilize evolving pedagogic methods, particularly the revolution in 
information and communications technology”, 4 under the heading “Ways to introduce 
disarmament and nonproliferation education into post-conflict situations as a contribution to 
peace-building.” and the final 4 under “Next stages and implementation.”.    
  
67.  The study was welcomed by the General Assembly in resolution 57/6044 on 22 
November 2002 which called upon the Secretary-General to prepare a report reviewing the 
results of the implementation of the recommendations and to submit it to the General 
Assembly at its fifty-ninth session.    The first such report was submitted as A/59/178 on 23 
July 2004 together with Add. 1 and Add. 2 in September and November 2004 respectively.  
This reported on responses from seven States: Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Russian 
Federation  Sweden, and Venezuela and in Add. 2 from Japan.  Five of the seven responses 
were from States who provided experts (Hungary, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and 
Japan).  It is thus evident that there has been only limited response to the initiative 
represented by the 2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation 
Education 
                                                 
43 United Nations, Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly 55/33 General and Complete Disarmament E: 
UNITED NATIONS STUDY ON DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION EDUCATION, A/RES/55/33, 
12 January 2001.  Available at http://un.org 
 
44 United Nations, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 57/60. United Nations study on disarmament 
and nonproliferation education, A/RES/57/60, 30 December 2002. Available at http://www.un.org   
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68.  The next group of recommendations come from the section on Compliance, Verification, 
Enforcement and the Role of the United Nations.  The first one considered here is 
Recommendation 56 which relates to the establishment of a small professional subsidiary 
unit to the UN Security Council: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 56 
 
The UN Security Council should establish a small subsidiary unit that could provide 
professional technical information and advice on matters relating to weapons of mass 
destruction. At the request of the Council or the Secretary-General, it should organize 
ad hoc inspections and monitoring in the field, using a roster of well trained 
inspectors that should be kept up-to-date. 
 
This recommendation is strongly supported as the experience gained by UNMOVIC has 
demonstrated45 the value and effectiveness of such a small unit.  Table 11.2 in The Search for 
Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction set out some six options for the future use of 
UNMOVIC capabilities; 
 
 
 
 
 
Option Summary Comment 
1 UNMOVIC and the IAEA to implement 
an ongoing monitoring and verification 
regime in Iraq until such time as Iraq has 
become a Party to the CWC and has 
entered into the Additional Protocol with 
the IAEA.   UNMOVIC and the IAEA to 
confirm that Iraq has been disarmed. 
Essentially a continuation 
of the current role of 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA 
2 The expertise and capabilities of 
UNMOVIC together with the IAEA to 
provide the necessary international system 
of verification and control for a Middle 
East WMD free zone. 
Depends on acceptance by 
countries in the region 
3 The expertise and capabilities of 
UNMOVIC to be used by the UN 
Secretary-General should a request be 
made to him for an investigation of an 
alleged use of biological or toxin 
weapons. 
Pending the eventual 
negotiation of a 
strengthened BTWC 
regime 
4 The expertise and capabilities of 
UNMOVIC to be retained as a secretariat 
to nurture and sustain the BTWC and 
likewise to support ongoing multilateral 
initiatives in relation to export controls 
Pending the eventual 
negotiation of a 
strengthened BTWC 
regime and of a chemical 
and biological weapons 
                                                 
45 Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction; Inspection, Verification and Non-
Proliferation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.  See Chapter 11 Future Roles for UNMOVIC and its Expertise. 
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relevant to chemical and biological 
weapons and to missiles used to deliver 
weapons of mass destruction. 
export control regime and a 
missile regime 
5 The expertise and capabilities of 
UNMOVIC to serve on behalf of the 
Security Council to inspect  countries of 
concern to determine whether activities 
and facilities are engaged in activities 
prohibited under the international 
conventions such as the BTWC and the 
CWC. 
Depends on whether such 
inspections are more likely 
to be carried out bilaterally 
6 The expertise and capabilities of 
UNMOVIC to assist Security Council in 
implementation of non-proliferation SCR 
1540(2004)  
Might be limited to those 
areas related to biological 
weapons and to missiles 
 
 
67.  Recommendation 57.   This addresses enforcement which it is argued should be the 
term used for acts related to the upholding of existing legal obligations by forceful means, 
political, economic or military. 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 57  
 
International legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction must be 
enforced. International enforcement action should be taken only after credible 
investigation and authoritative finding of non-compliance with legal obligations. 
 
This recommendation is strongly supported as both elements are entirely valid – first, that the 
international legal obligations must be enforced and, secondly, that the evidence for non-
compliance with legal obligations must be evident to all and based on credible and 
demonstrable evidence. 
 
68.  Recommendation 60.   This addresses the role of the UN Security Council: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 60 
 
The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to 
reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction – whether they are 
linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or terrorists. It should take up for 
consideration any withdrawal from or breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction. Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions 
with binding effect for all members, the Council may, inter alia: 
 
• require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, 
inspection and verification; 
 
• require member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation 
of specific rules or measures; and 
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• decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military 
enforcement measures. 
 
Before UN reform has made the Security Council more representative of the UN 
membership, it is especially important that binding decisions should be preceded by 
effective consultation to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the UN 
and will be accepted and respected. 
 
69.  This recommendation is strongly supported as the study of the UN activities in Iraq46 has 
demonstrated that the Security Council’s ability to focus on the threat to international security 
posed by weapons of mass destruction is variable and, furthermore, that the P5 members are 
liable to put their own national interests before the importance on ensuring through its 
concerted international action that weapons of mass destruction – in regard to biological and 
chemical weapons – are totally prohibited. 
 
Conclusions 
 
70.  The WMDC have produced a good set of recommendations 31 to 36 relating to 
biological and toxin weapons which they have, quite rightly, focussed on the forthcoming 
Sixth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to be held in 
Geneva from 20 November to 8 December 2006.  They are much more pertinent and 
appropriate than those produced by the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change47. 
 
71.  Recommendation 31 on universality: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 31 
 
All states not yet party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should 
adhere to the Convention. The states parties to the Convention should launch a 
campaign to achieve universal adherence by the time of the Seventh Review 
Conference, to be held in 2011. 
 
is strongly supported as written.  
 
72.  Recommendation 32 on national implementation with a slight modification of the 
second sentence (changes shown in bold): 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 32 
 
To achieve universal adoption of national legislation and regulations to implement 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention completely and effectively, the states 
parties should offer technical assistance and promote best-practice models of such 
legislation. As a part of the confidence-building process and to promote transparency 
                                                 
46 Graham S. Pearson, The UNSCOM Saga Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation, 
Macmillan/St. Martin’s Press (1999), and Graham S. Pearson, The Search for Iraq’s Weapons of Mass 
Destruction; Inspection, Verification and Non-Proliferation, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. 
47 See analysis in Graham S. Pearson, The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel: Biological Weapons 
Related Issues, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Review Conference Paper No. 14, May 
2005.  Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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and harmonization, all states parties should make annual life sciences-related 
national declarations and make them public. 
 
is strongly supported as modified. 
 
73. Recommendation 33 on the UN Secretary-General’s investigatory powers with slight 
modification (changes shown in bold): 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 33 
 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should enhance the 
investigatory powers of the UN Secretary-General, ensuring that the Secretary-
General’s office can rely upon a regularly up-dated roster of trained experts drawn 
from member States and advice from the World Health Organization, the World 
Organization for Animal Health and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
together with a specialist unit, modelled on the United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission, to assist in investigating unusual outbreaks 
of disease and allegations of the use of biological weapons. 
 
is strongly supported as modified. 
 
74. Recommendation 34 on a standing secretariat  for the BTWC: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 34 
 
States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention should establish a 
standing secretariat to handle organizational and administrative matters related to 
the treaty, such as Review Conferences and expert meetings. 
 
is strongly supported as written. 
 
75. Recommendation 35 on responses to major outbreaks whether natural or deliberate with 
slight modification in the first sentence (changes shown in bold): 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 35 
 
Governments should pursue public health surveillance to ensure effective monitoring 
of unusual outbreaks of disease and develop practical methods of coordinating 
international responses international responses to any major outbreaks whether 
natural or deliberate. They should strengthen cooperation between civilian health 
and security-oriented authorities, nationally, regionally and worldwide, including in 
the framework of the new International Health Regulations of the World Health 
Organization. Governments should also review their national biosafety and 
biosecurity measures to protect health and the environment from the release of 
biological and toxin materials. They should harmonize national biosecurity 
standards. 
 
is strongly supported as amended. 
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76.  Recommendation 36 on reaffirmations of the common understandings reached by 
previous Review Conferences: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 36 
 
At the Sixth Review Conference, in 2006, the states parties to the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention should reaffirm common understandings reached at 
previous review conferences and take action on all subjects addressed at Convention 
meetings since 2003. They should also establish a work programme on additional 
topics for future meetings. States parties should ensure more frequent reassessment of 
the implications of scientific and technological developments and reaffirm that all 
undertakings under Article I of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention apply 
to such developments. This Review Conference should reaffirm that all developments 
in the life sciences fall within the scope of the Convention and that all developments 
in the life sciences for hostile purposes are prohibited by the Convention. 
 
is strongly supported.  However, as noted above in paragraph 58, the penultimate sentence 
calling for more frequent reassessments of the implications of scientific and technological 
developments requires a mechanism as suggested in paragraph 58.  The reassessment needs 
to be followed within a few months by a reaffirmation that the undertaking given by the 
States Parties in Article I applies to all such developments. 
 
77.  Of the other recommendations that apply to weapons of mass destruction more 
generally rather than specifically to biological and toxin weapons, these should also be 
addressed, as appropriate, at the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC. 
 
78.  Recommendation 47 addressing export-control regimes: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 47 
 
All states should conduct audits of their export control enforcement agencies 
(customs, police, coastguard, border control and military) to ensure that they can 
carry out their tasks effectively. States should seek to establish a universal system of 
export controls providing harmonized standards, enhanced transparency and 
practical support for implementation. Members of the five export control regimes [the 
Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, the Zangger Committee and the Wassenaar Arrangement] should promote a 
widening of their membership and improve implementation in view of current security 
challenges, without impeding legitimate trade and economic development. 
 
is relevant to consideration at the Sixth Review Conference of the outcome of the annual 
Meeting of States Parties in 2003 which considered the topics: 
 
i. the adoption of necessary national measures to implement the prohibitions set forth 
in the Convention, including the enactment of penal legislation; and 
 
ii. national mechanisms to establish and maintain the security and oversight of 
pathogenic microorganisms and toxins; 
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Consequently, WMDC Recommendation 47 will be relevant to the consideration of Article 
III, Article  IV and Article X of the BTWC at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
79. Recommendation 49 addressing the responsibilities of industrial companies: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 49 
 
Companies engaged in activities relevant to weapons of mass destruction have the 
ability and responsibility to help prevent the proliferation of such weapons and an 
interest in demonstrating that they are fulfilling that responsibility, including full 
compliance with national and international obligations and public transparency.  
Trade associations should promote such objectives. 
 
will be relevant to consideration of Article IV of the BTWC at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
80.  Recommendation 50 relating to codes of practice and codes of conduct (as amended 
with changes shown in bold): 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 50 
 
States, international organizations and professional associations should encourage 
all those engaged in activities in weapons of mass destruction-relevant fields whether 
in academia, industry or government to adopt and effectively implement codes of 
practice and codes of conduct for all such activities. Appropriate academic, 
professional and industrial associations should encourage the adoption of such 
codes of conduct or practice. 
 
will be relevant to the consideration at the Review Conference of the outcome of the annual 
Meeting of States Parties in 2005 which considered the topic: 
 
v. the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
Consequently, WMDC Recommendation 50 will be relevant to the consideration of Article 
IV and Article X at the Sixth Review Conference. 
 
81.  Recommendation 51 relating to the informing of and involvement of parliaments in 
regard to stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 51 
 
Governments possessing any weapons of mass destruction should keep their 
parliaments fully and currently informed of their holdings of such weapons and their 
activities to reduce and eliminate them. Parliaments should actively seek such 
information and recognize their responsibility in formulating policies relevant to 
weapons of mass destruction issues. Greater inter-parliamentary cooperation on 
weapons of mass destruction issues is needed. 
 
will not be relevant to the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC as no State Party to the 
BTWC has admitted to possessing such weapons. 
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82. Recommendation 52 relating to the involvement on NGOs: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 52 
 
States should assist Non-Governmental Organizations to actively participate in 
international meetings and conferences, and to inform and campaign in the weapons 
of mass destruction field.  Private foundations should substantially increase their 
support for such organizations that are working to eliminate global weapons of mass 
destruction threats. 
 
is relevant to the Sixth Review Conference.  It is probable that, as at previous BTWC Review 
Conferences, NGOs will be able to participate as observers at the plenary sessions and 
receive the official documents of the Review Conference and that, in informal session, with 
the President of the Review Conference in the chair, NGOs will have the opportunity to make 
short statements to the Review Conference. 
 
83.  Recommendation 53 relating to education and informed public debate: 
 
 WMDC RECOMMENDATION 53 
 
Organizations with security-relevant agendas should re-examine the 2002 United 
Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education, and should 
consider ways in which they could foster and support such education and an informed 
public debate. Governments should fund student internships at multilateral 
institutions working on weapons of mass destruction issues. 
 
will be relevant to the consideration of Article IV at the Review Conference as previous Final 
Declarations such as that of the Fourth Review Conference have in the Article IV section 
declared: 
 
3. The Conference notes the importance of: 
 
- Legislative, administrative and other measures designed to enhance 
domestic compliance with the Convention; 
 
- Legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories and facilities to 
prevent unauthorized access to and removal of microbial or other biological 
agents, or toxins: 
 
- Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions 
contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925. 
 
4. The Conference believes that such measures which States Parties might undertake 
in accordance with their constitutional processes would strengthen the effectiveness 
of the Convention, as requested by the Second and Third Review Conferences. 
 
States Parties will wish to review the recommendations made by the 2002 United Nations 
Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education and consider what statements might 
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be appropriate at the Sixth Review Conference and whether to propose language for the Final 
Declaration. 
 
84. Recommendation 56 relating to the establishment of a small professional subsidiary unit 
to the UN Security Council: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 56 
 
The UN Security Council should establish a small subsidiary unit that could provide 
professional technical information and advice on matters relating to weapons of mass 
destruction. At the request of the Council or the Secretary-General, it should organize 
ad hoc inspections and monitoring in the field, using a roster of well trained 
inspectors that should be kept up-to-date. 
 
is related to Recommendation 33 which was addressed at paragraph 38 above and is also 
related to the consideration at the Review Conference of the outcome of the annual Meeting 
of States Parties which in 2004 addressed the following topic: 
 
iii. enhancing international capabilities for responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or 
suspicious outbreaks of disease; 
 
Consequently, both Recommendation 33 and 56 will be relevant to the consideration at the 
Review Conference of Article VI, and possibly also Article V, of the Convention. 
 
85.  Recommendation 57 relating to enforcement in regard to acts related to the upholding 
of existing legal obligations by forceful means, political, economic or military. 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 57  
 
International legal obligations regarding weapons of mass destruction must be 
enforced. International enforcement action should be taken only after credible 
investigation and authoritative finding of non-compliance with legal obligations. 
 
is relevant to considerations at the Review Conference of compliance in relation to Article I 
of the Convention and also in relation to Article V and Article VI of the BTWC. 
 
86.  Recommendation 60 addressing the role of the UN Security Council: 
 
WMDC RECOMMENDATION 60 
 
The United Nations Security Council should make greater use of its potential to 
reduce and eliminate threats of weapons of mass destruction – whether they are 
linked to existing arsenals, proliferation or terrorists. It should take up for 
consideration any withdrawal from or breach of an obligation not to acquire weapons 
of mass destruction. Making use of its authority under the Charter to take decisions 
with binding effect for all members, the Council may, inter alia: 
 
• require individual states to accept effective and comprehensive monitoring, 
inspection and verification; 
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• require member states to enact legislation to secure global implementation 
of specific rules or measures; and 
 
• decide, as instance of last resort, on the use of economic or military 
enforcement measures. 
 
Before UN reform has made the Security Council more representative of the UN 
membership, it is especially important that binding decisions should be preceded by 
effective consultation to ensure that they are supported by the membership of the UN 
and will be accepted and respected. 
 
is primarily a matter for consideration by the Security Council.   However, the element in 
recommendation relating to any withdrawal from … an obligation not to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction is relevant to the consideration at the Review Conference of Article XIII of 
the Convention.    Likewise, the element relating to any … breach of an obligation not to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction is relevant to the consideration at the Review 
Conference of Article VI of the Convention. 
 
87.   The recommendations of the WMDC, in some cases with slight modification, are thus 
highly relevant to the forthcoming Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC to be held in 
Geneva from 20 November to 8 December 2006.  The States Parties are urged to take these 
recommendations into account in their preparations for the Review Conference and, as 
recommended in Bradford Review Conference Paper No. 16, to start considering successful 
outcomes identified therein now and to draft language that they can submit to the Committee 
of the Whole in regard to the relevant Articles of the Convention.  In addition, States Parties 
with a particular interest in one or more of the successful outcomes are encouraged to prepare 
and submit Working Papers to the Review Conference.  As noted in the introduction, success 
is rarely accidental and needs to be planned for. 
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